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Abstract. Hyperproperties are properties of sets of computation traces.
In this paper, we study quantitative hyperproperties, which we define as
hyperproperties that express a bound on the number of traces that may
appear in a certain relation. For example, quantitative non-interference
limits the amount of information about certain secret inputs that is
leaked through the observable outputs of a system. Quantitative non-
interference thus bounds the number of traces that have the same ob-
servable input but different observable output. We study quantitative
hyperproperties in the setting of HyperLTL, a temporal logic for hy-
perproperties. We show that, while quantitative hyperproperties can be
expressed in HyperLTL, the running time of the HyperLTL model check-
ing algorithm is, depending on the type of property, exponential or even
doubly exponential in the quantitative bound. We improve this com-
plexity with a new model checking algorithm based on model-counting.
The new algorithm needs only logarithmic space in the bound and there-
fore improves, depending on the property, exponentially or even doubly
exponentially over the model checking algorithm of HyperLTL. In the
worst case, the new algorithm needs polynomial space in the size of the
system. Our Max#Sat-based prototype implementation demonstrates,
however, that the counting approach is viable on systems with nontrivial
quantitative information flow requirements such as a passcode checker.
1 Introduction
Model checking algorithms [17] are the cornerstone of computer-aided verifica-
tion. As their input consists of both the system under verification and a logical
formula that describes the property to be verified, they uniformly solve a wide
range of verification problems, such as all verification problems expressible in
linear-time temporal logic (LTL), computation-tree logic (CTL), or the modal
µ-calculus. Recently, there has been a lot of interest in extending model checking
from standard trace and tree properties to information flow policies like obser-
vational determinism or quantitative information flow. Such policies are called
hyperproperties [21] and can be expressed in HyperLTL [18], an extension of LTL
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with trace quantifiers and trace variables. For example, observational determin-
ism [47], the requirement that any pair of traces that have the same observable
input also have the same observable output, can be expressed as the following
HyperLTL formula: ∀pi.∀pi′. ( pi =I pi′) → ( pi =O pi′). For many information
flow policies of interest, including observational determinism, there is no longer
a need for property-specific algorithms: it has been shown that the standard
HyperLTL model checking algorithm [26] performs just as well as a specialized
algorithm for the respective property.
The class of hyperproperties studied in this paper is one where, by con-
trast, the standard model checking algorithm performes badly. We are inter-
ested in quantitative hyperproperties, i.e., hyperproperties that express a bound
on the number of traces that may appear in a certain relation. A prominent
example of this class of properties is quantitative non-interference [43,45], where
we allow some flow of information but, at the same time, limit the amount
of information that may be leaked. Such properties are used, for example, to
describe the correct behavior of a password check, where some information
flow is unavoidable (“the password was incorrect”), and perhaps some extra
information flow is accceptable (“the password must contain a special charac-
ter”), but the information should not suffice to guess the actual password. In
HyperLTL, quantitative non-interference can be expressed [18] as the formula
∀pi0. ∀pi1 . . . ∀pi2c . (
∧
i (pii =I pi0))→
(∨
i 6=j (pii =O pij)
)
. The formula states
that there do not exist 2c + 1 traces (corresponding to more than c bits of in-
formation) with the same observable input but different observable output. The
bad performance of the standard model checking algorithm is a consequence of
the fact that the 2c + 1 traces are tracked simultaneously. For this purpose, the
model checking algorithm builds and analyzes a (2c + 1)-fold self-composition of
the system.
We present a new model checking algorithm for quantitative hyperproperties
that avoids the construction of the huge self-composition. The key idea of our ap-
proach is to use counting rather than checking as the basic operation. Instead of
building the self-composition and then checking the satisfaction of the formula,
we add new atomic propositions and then count the number of sequences of
evaluations of the new atomic propositions that satisfy the specification. Quan-
titative hyperproperties are expressions of the following form:
∀pi1. . . .∀pik. ϕ→ (#σ : X.ψ / n),
where / ∈ {≤, <,≥, >,=}. The universal quantifiers introduce a set of reference
traces against which other traces can be compared. The formulas ϕ and ψ are
HyperLTL formulas. The counting quantifer #σ : X.ψ counts the number of
paths σ with different valuations of the atomic propositions X that satisfy ψ. The
requirement that no more than c bits of information are leaked is the following
quantitative hyperproperty:
∀pi.#σ : O. (pi =I σ) ≤ 2c
As we show in the paper, such expressions do not change the expressiveness of
the logic; however, they allow us to express quantitative hyperproperties in expo-
nentially more concise form. The counting-based model checking algorithm then
maintains this advantage with a logarithmic counter, resulting in exponentially
better performance in both time and space.
The viability of our counting-based model checking algorithm is demon-
strated on a Max#SAT-based prototype implementation. For quantitative hy-
perproperties of intrest, such as bounded leakage of a password checker, our al-
gorithm shows promising results, as it significantly outperforms existing model
checking approaches.
1.1 Related Work
Quantitative information-flow has been studied extensively in the literature. See,
for example, the following selection of contributions on this topic: [43,34,19,14,1,32].
Multiple verification methods for quantitative information-flow were proposed
for sequential systems. For example, with static analysis techniques [15], ap-
proximation methods [35], equivalence relations [22,3], and randomized meth-
ods [35]. Quantitative information-flow for multi-threaded programs was consid-
ered in [11].
The study of quantitative information-flow in a reactive setting gained a
lot of attention recently after the introduction of hyperproperties [21] and the
idea of verifying the self-composition of a reactive system [6] in order to relate
traces to each other. There are several possibilities to measure the amount of
leakage, such as Shannon entropy [24,15,37], guessing entropy [34,3], and min-
entropy [43]. A classification of quantitative information-flow policies as safety
and liveness hyperproperties was given in [46]. While several verification tech-
niques for hyperproperties exists [5,31,38,42], the literature was missing general
approaches to quantitative information-flow control. SecLTL [25] was introduced
as first general approach to model check (quantitative) hyperproperties, before
HyperLTL [18], and its corresponding model checker [26], was introduced as a
temporal logic for hyperproperties, which subsumes the previous approaches.
Using counting to compute the number of solutions of a given formula is stud-
ied in the literature as well and includes many probabilistic inference problems,
such as Bayesian net reasoning [36], and planning problems, such as computing
robustness of plans in incomplete domains [40]. State-of-the-art tools for propo-
sitional model counting are Relsat [33] and c2d [23]. Algorithms for counting
models of temporal logics and automata over infinite words have been intro-
duced in [27,28,44]. The counting of projected models, i.e., when some parts of
the models are irrelevant, was studied in [2], for which tools such as #CLASP [2]
and DSharp P [2,41] exist. Our SAT-based prototype implementation is based on
a reduction to a Max#SAT [29] instance, for which a corresponding tool exists.
Among the already existing tools for computing the amount of information
leakage, for example, QUAIL [8], which analyzes programs written in a specific
while-language and LeakWatch [12], which estimates the amount of leakage in
Java programs, Moped-QLeak [9] is closest to our approach. However, their ap-
proach of computing a symbolic summary as an Algebraic Decision Diagram
is, in contrast to our approach, solely based on model counting, not maximum
model counting.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 HyperLTL
HyperLTL [18] extends linear-time temporal logic (LTL) with trace variables
and trace quantifiers. Let AP be a set of atomic propositions. A trace t is an
infinite sequence over subsets of the atomic propositions. We define the set of
traces TR := (2AP )ω. A subset T ⊆ TR is called a trace property and a subset
H ⊆ 2TR is called a hyperproperty. We use the following notation to manipulate
traces: let t ∈ TR be a trace and i ∈ N be a natural number. t[i] denotes the
i-th element of t. Therefore, t[0] represents the starting element of the trace. Let
j ∈ N and j ≥ i. t[i, j] denotes the sequence t[i] t[i + 1] . . . t[j − 1] t[j]. t[i,∞]
denotes the infinite suffix of t starting at position i.
HyperLTL Syntax. Let V be an infinite supply of trace variables. The syntax of
HyperLTL is given by the following grammar:
ψ ::= ∃pi. ψ | ∀pi. ψ | ϕ
ϕ ::= api | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ | ϕ U ϕ
where a ∈ AP is an atomic proposition and pi ∈ V is a trace variable. Note
that atomic propositions are indexed by trace variables. The quantification over
traces makes it possible to express properties like “on all traces ψ must hold”,
which is expressed by ∀pi. ψ. Dually, one can express that “there exists a trace
such that ψ holds”, which is denoted by ∃pi. ψ. The derived operators , ,
and W are defined as for LTL. We abbreviate the formula ∧x∈X(xpi ↔ xpi′),
expressing that the traces pi and pi′ are equal with respect to a set X ⊆ AP of
atomic propositions, by pi =X pi
′. Furthermore, we call a trace variable pi free in
a HyperLTL formula if there is no quantification over pi and we call a HyperLTL
formula ϕ closed if there exists no free trace variable in ϕ.
HyperLTL Semantics. A HyperLTL formula defines a hyperproperty, i.e., a set
of sets of traces. A set T of traces satisfies the hyperproperty if it is an element
of this set of sets. Formally, the semantics of HyperLTL formulas is given with
respect to a trace assignment Π from V to TR, i.e., a partial function mapping
trace variables to actual traces. Π[pi 7→ t] denotes that pi is mapped to t, with
everything else mapped according to Π. Π[i,∞] denotes the trace assignment
that is equal to Π(pi)[i,∞] for all pi.
Π |=T ∃pi.ψ iff there exists t ∈ T : Π[pi 7→ t] |=T ψ
Π |=T ∀pi.ψ iff for all t ∈ T : Π[pi 7→ t] |=T ψ
Π |=T api iff a ∈ Π(pi)[0]
Π |=T ¬ψ iff Π 6|=T ψ
Π |=T ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff Π |=T ψ1 or Π |=T ψ2
Π |=T ψ iff Π[1,∞] |=T ψ
Π |=T ψ1 U ψ2 iff there exists i ≥ 0 : Π[i,∞] |=T ψ2
and for all 0 ≤ j < i we have Π[j,∞] |=T ψ1
We say a set of traces T satisfies a HyperLTL formula ϕ if Π |=T ϕ, where Π is
the empty trace assignment.
2.2 System model
A Kripke structure is a tuple K = (S, s0, δ,AP , L) consisting of a set of states
S, an initial state s0 ∈ S, a transition function δ : S → 2S , a set of atomic
propositions AP , and a labeling function L : S → 2AP , which labels every state
with a set of atomic propositions. We assume that each state has a successor,
i.e., δ(s) 6= ∅. This ensures that every run on a Kripke structure can always be
extended to an infinite run. We define a path of a Kripke structure as an infinite
sequence of states s0s1 · · · ∈ Sω such that s0 is the initial state of K and si+1 ∈
δ(si) for every i ∈ N. We denote the set of all paths of K that start in a state s
with Paths(K, s). Furthermore, Paths∗(K, s) denotes the set of all path prefixes
and Pathsω(K, s) the set of all path suffixes. A trace of a Kripke structure is an
infinite sequence of sets of atomic propositions L(s0), L(s1), · · · ∈ (2AP )ω, such
that s0 is the initial state of K and si+1 ∈ δ(si) for every i ∈ N. We denote the
set of all traces of K that start in a state s with TR(K, s). We say that a Kripke
structure K satisfies a HyperLTL formula ϕ if its set of traces satisfies ϕ, i.e., if
Π |=TR(K,s0) ϕ, where Π is the empty trace assignment.
2.3 Automata over infinite words
In our construction we use automata over infinite words. A Bu¨chi automaton
is a tuple B = (Q,Q0, δ, Σ, F ), where Q is a set of states, Q0 is a set of initial
states, δ : Q × Σ → 2Q is a transition relation, and F ⊂ Q are the accepting
states. A run of B on an infinite word w = α1α2 · · · ∈ Σω is an infinite sequence
r = q0q1 · · · ∈ Qω of states, where q0 ∈ Q0 and for each i ≥ 0, qi+1 = δ(qi, αi+1).
We define Inf(r) = {q ∈ Q | ∀i∃j > i. rj = q}. A run r is called accepting if
Inf(r) ∩ F 6= ∅. A word w is accepted by B and called a model of B if there is
an accepting run of B on w.
Furthermore, an alternating automaton, whose runs generalize from sequences
to trees, is a tuple A = (Q,Q0, δ, Σ, F ). Q,Q0, Σ, and F are defined as above
and δ : Q × Σ → B+Q being a transition function, which maps a state and a
symbol into a Boolean combination of states. Thus, a run(-tree) of an alternat-
ing Bu¨chi automaton A on an infinite word w is a Q-labeled tree. A word w is
accepted by A and called a model if there exists a run-tree T such that all paths
p trough T are accepting, i.e., Inf(p) ∩ F 6= ∅.
A strongly connected component (SCC) inA is a maximal strongly connected
component of the graph induced by the automaton. An SCC is called accepting
if one of its states is an accepting state in A.
3 Quantitative Hyperproperties
Quantitative Hyperproperties are properties of sets of computation traces that
express a bound on the number of traces that may appear in a certain relation. In
the following, we study quantitative hyperproperties that are specified in terms
of HyperLTL formulas. We consider expressions of the following general form:
∀pi1, . . . , pik. ϕ→ (#σ : A. ψ / n)
Both the universally quantified variables pi1, . . . , pik and the variable σ after the
counting operator # are trace variables; ϕ is a HyperLTL formula over atomic
propositions AP and free trace variables pi1 . . . pik; A ⊆ AP is a set of atomic
propositions; ψ is a HyperLTL formula over atomic propositions AP and free
trace variables pi1 . . . pik and, additionally σ. The operator / ∈ {<,≤,=, >,≥} is
a comparison operator; and n ∈ N is a natural number.
For a given set of traces T and a valuation of the trace variables pi1, . . . , pik,
the term #σ : A.ψ computes the number of traces σ in T that differ in their val-
uation of the atomic propositions in A and satisfy ψ. The expression #σ : A.ψ/n
is true iff the resulting number satisfies the comparison with n. Finally, the com-
plete expression ∀pi1, . . . , pik. ϕ→ (#σ : A.ψ / n) is true iff for all combinations
pi1, . . . , pik of traces in T that satisfy ϕ, the comparison #σ : A.ψ /n is satisfied.
Example 1 (Quantitative non-interference). Quantitative information-flow poli-
cies [30,13,34,20] allow the flow of a bounded amount of information. One way to
measure leakage is with min-entropy [43], which quantifies the amount of infor-
mation an attacker can gain given the answer to a single guess about the secret.
The bounding problem [45] for min-entropy is to determine whether that amount
is bounded from above by a constant 2c, corresponding to c bits. We assume that
the program whose leakage is being quantified is deterministic, and assume that
the secret input to that program is uniformly distributed. The bounding prob-
lem then reduces to determining that there is no tuple of 2c + 1 distinguishable
traces [43,45]. Let O ⊆ AP be the set of observable outputs. A simple quanti-
tative information flow policy is then the following quantitative hyperproperty,
which bounds the number of distinguishable outputs to 2c, corresponding to a
bound of c bits of information:
#σ : O. true ≤ 2c
A slightly more complicated information flow policy is quantitative non-interference.
In quantitative non-interference, the bound must be satisfied for every individ-
ual input. Let I ⊆ AP be the observable inputs to the system. Quantitative
non-interference is the following quantitative hyperproperty1:
∀pi.#σ : O. ( (pi =I σ)) ≤ 2c
For each trace pi in the system, the property checks whether there are more than
2c traces σ that have the same observable input as pi but different observable
output.
Example 2 (Deniability). A program satisfies deniability (see, for example, [7,10])
when there is no proof that a certain input occurred from simply observing the
output, i.e., given an output of a program one cannot derive the input that lead
to this output. A deterministic program satisfies deniability when each output
can be mapped to at least two inputs. A quantitative variant of deniability is
when we require that the number of corresponding inputs is larger than a given
threshold. Quantitative deniability can be specified as the following quantitative
Hyperproperty:
∀pi.#σ : I. ( (pi =O σ)) > n
For all traces pi of the system we count the number of sequences σ in the system
with different input sequences and the same output sequence of pi, i.e., for the
fixed output sequence given by pi we count the number of input sequences that
lead to this output.
4 Model Checking Quantitative Hyperproperties
We present a model checking algorithm for quantitative hyperproperties based on
model counting. The advantage of the algorithm is that its runtime complexity is
independent of the bound n and thus avoids the n-fold self-composition necessary
for any encoding of the quantitative hyperproperty in HyperLTL.
Before introducing our novel counting-based algorithm, we start by a trans-
lation of quantitative hyperproperties into formulas in HyperLTL and estab-
lishing an exponential lower bound for its representation.
4.1 Standard model checking algorithm: encoding quantitative
hyperproperties in HyperLTL
The idea of the reduction is to check a lower bound of n traces by existentially
quantifying over n traces, and to check an upper bound of n traces by universally
quantifying over n + 1 traces. The resulting HyperLTL formula can be verified
using the standard model checking algorithm for HyperLTL [18].
1 We write pi =A pi
′ short for piA = pi′A where piA is the A-projection of pi
Theorem 1. Every quantitative hyperproperty ∀pi1, . . . , pik. ψι → (#σ : A. ψ/n)
can be expressed as a HyperLTL formula. For / ∈ {≤}({<}), the HyperLTL
formula has n + k + 1(resp. n + k) universal trace quantifiers in addition to
the quantifiers in ψι and ψ. For / ∈ {≥}({>}), the HyperLTL formula has k
universal trace quantifiers and n (resp. n + 1) existential trace quantifiers in
addition to the quantifiers in ψι and ψ. For / ∈ {=}, the HyperLTL formula
has n + k + 1 universal trace quantifiers and n existential trace quantifiers in
addition to the quantifiers in ψι and ψ.
Proof. For / ∈ {≤}, we encode the quantitative hyperproperty ∀pi1, . . . , pik. ψι →
(#σ : A. ψ / n) as the following HyperLTL formula:
∀pi1, . . . , pik. ∀pi′1, . . . , pi′n+1.
ψι ∧∧
i 6=j
(pi′i 6=A pi′j)
→ (∨
i
¬ψ[σ 7→ pi′i]
)
where ψ[σ 7→ pi′i] is the HyperLTL formula ψ with all occurrences of σ replaced
by pi′i. The formula states that there is no tuple of n + 1 traces pi
′
1, . . . , pi
′
n+1
different in the evaluation of A, that satisfy ψ. In other words, for every n + 1
tuple of traces pi′1, . . . , pi
′
n+1 that differ in the evaluation of A, one of the paths
must violate ψ. For / ∈ {<}, we use the same formula, with ∀pi′1, . . . , pi′n instead
of ∀pi′1, . . . , pi′n+1.
For / ∈ {≥}, we encode the quantitative hyperproperty analogously as the
HyperLTL formula
∀pi1, . . . , pik. ∃pi′1, . . . , pi′n. ψι →
∧
i 6=j
(pi′i 6=A pi′j)
 ∧(∧
i
ψ[σ 7→ pi′i]
)
The formula states that there exist paths pi′1, . . . , pi
′
n that differ in the evalua-
tion of A and that all satisfy ψ. For / ∈ {>}, we use the same formula, with
∃pi′1, . . . , pi′n+1 instead of ∀pi′1, . . . , pi′n. Lastly, for / ∈ {=}, we encode the quanti-
tative hyperproperty as a conjunction of the encodings for ≤ and for ≥.
Example 3 (Quantitative non-interference in HyperLTL). As discussed in Ex-
ample 1, quantitative non-interference is the quantitative hyperproperty
∀pi.#σ : O. (pi =I σ) ≤ 2c,
where we measure the amount of leakage with min-entropy [43]. The bounding
problem for min-entropy asks whether the amount of information leaked by a
system is bounded by a constant 2c where c is the number of bits. This is encoded
in HyperLTL as the requirement that there are no 2c + 1 traces distinguishable
in their output:
∀pi0. ∀pi1 . . . ∀pi2c .
(∧
i
(pii =I pi0)
)
→
∨
i 6=j
(pii =O pij)
 .
This formula is equivalent to the formalization of quantitative non-interference
given in [26].
Model checking quantitative hyperproperties via the reduction to HyperLTL
is very expensive. In the best case, when / ∈ {≤, <}, ψι does not contain ex-
istential quantifiers, and ψ does not contain universal quantifiers, we obtain an
HyperLTL formula without quantifier alternations, where the number of quan-
tifiers grows linearly with the bound n. For m quantifiers, the HyperLTL model
checking algorithm [26] constructs and analyzes the m-fold self-composition of
the Kripke structure. The running time of the model checking algorithm is thus
exponential in the bound. If / ∈ {≥, >,=}, the encoding additionally introduces
a quantifier alternation. The model checking algorithm checks quantifier alterna-
tions via a complementation of Bu¨chi automata, which adds another exponent,
resulting in an overall doubly exponential running time.
The model checking algorithm we introduce in the next section avoids the
n-fold self-composition needed in the model checking algorithm of HyperLTL
and its complexity is independent of the bound n.
4.2 Counting-based model checking algorithm
A Kripke structure K = (S, s0, τ,AP, L) violates a quantitative hyperproperty
ϕ = ∀pi1, . . . , pik. ψι → (#σ : A.ψ / n)
if there is a k-tuple t = (pi1, . . . , pik) of traces pii ∈ TR(K) that satisfies the
formula
∃pi1, . . . , pik. ψι ∧ (#σ : A. ψ /n)
where / is the negation of the comparison operator /. The tuple t then satisfies
the property ψι and the number of (k + 1)-tuples t
′ = (pi1, . . . , pik, σ) for σ ∈
TR(K) that satisfy ψ and differ pairwise in the A-projection of σ satisfies the
comparison / n (The A-projection of a sequence σ is defined as the sequence
σA ∈ (2A)ω, such that for every position i and every a ∈ A it holds that a ∈ σA[i]
if and only if a ∈ σ[i]). The tuples t′ can be captured by the automaton composed
of the product of an automaton Aψι∧ψ that accepts all k+1 of traces that satisfy
both ψι and ψ and a k + 1-self composition of K. Each accepting run of the
product automaton presents k+ 1 traces of K that satisfy ψι ∧ψ. On top of the
product automaton, we apply a special counting algorithm which we explain in
detail in Section 4.4 and check if the result satisfies the comparison / n.
Algorithm 1 gives a general picture of our model checking algorithm. The
algorithm has two parts. The first part applies if the relation / is one of {≥, >}.
In this case, the algorithm checks whether a sequence over APψ (propositions
in ψ) corresponds to infinitely many sequences over A. This is done by checking
whether the product automaton B has a so-called doubly pumped lasso(DPL),
a subgraph with two connected lassos, with a unique sequence over APψ and
different sequences over A. Such a doubly pumped lasso matches the same se-
quence over APψ with infinitely many sequences over A (more in section 4.4).
If no doubly pumped lasso is found, a projected model counting algorithm is
applied in the second part of the algorithm in order to compute either the maxi-
mum or the minimum value, corresponding to the comparison operator /. In the
next subsections, we explain the individual parts of the algorithm in detail.
Algorithm 1 Counting-based Model Checking of Quantitative Hyperproperties
Input: Quantitative Hyperproperty ϕ = ∀pi1 . . . pik. ψι → (#σ : A.ψ / n), Kripke Structure K =
(S, s0, τ,AP, L)
Output: K |= ϕ
1: B = QHLTL2BA(K,pi1, . . . , pik, ψι ∧ ψ)
2: /*Check Infinity*/
3: if / ∈ {≥, >} then
4: ce = DPL(B)
5: if ce 6= ⊥ then
6: return ce
7: /*Apply Projected Counting Algorithm*/
8: if / ∈ {≥, >} then
9: ce = MaxCount(B,n, /)
10: else
11: ce = MinCount(B,n, /)
12: return ce
4.3 Bu¨chi automata for quantitative hyperproperties
For a quantitative hyperproperty ϕ = ∀pi1 . . . pik. ψι → (#σ : A.ψ / n) and a
Kripke structure K = (S, s0, τ,AP, L), we first construct an alternating automa-
ton Aψι∧ψ for the HyperLTL property ψι ∧ ψ. Let Aψ1 = (Q1, q0,1, Σ2, δ1, F1)
and Aψ2 = (Q2, q0,2, Σ2, δ2, F2) be alternating automata for subformulas ψ1 and
ψ2. Let Σ = 2
APϕ where APϕ are all indexed atomic propositions that appear
in ϕ. Aψι∧ψ is constructed using following rules
2:
ϕ = api Aϕ = ({q0}, q0, Σ, δ, ∅) where δ(q0, α) = (api ∈ α)
ϕ = ¬api Aϕ = ({q0}, q0, Σ, δ, ∅) where δ(q0, α) = (api 6∈ α)
ϕ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2 Aϕ = (Q1 ∪· Q2 ∪· {q0}, q0, Σ, δ, F1 ∪· F2)
where δ(q, α) = δ1(q0,1, α) ∧ δ2(q0,2, α)
and δ(q, α) = δi(q, α) when q ∈ Qi for i ∈ {1, 2}
ϕ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2 Aϕ = (Q1 ∪· Q2 ∪· {q0}, q0, Σ, δ, F1 ∪· F2)
where δ(q, α) = δ1(q0,1, α) ∨ δ2(q0,2, α)
and δ(q, α) = δi(q, α) when q ∈ Qi for i ∈ {1, 2}
ϕ = ψ1 Aϕ = (Q1 ∪· {q0}, q0, Σ, δ, F1)
where δ(q, α) = q0,1
and δ(q, α) = δ1(q, α) for q ∈ Q1
ϕ = ψ1 U ψ2 Aϕ = (Q1 ∪· Q2 ∪· {q0}, q0, Σ, δ, F1 ∪· F2)
where δ(q0, α) = δ2(q0,2, α) ∨ (δ1(q0,1, α) ∧ q0)
and δ(q, α) = δi(q, α) when q ∈ Qi for i ∈ {1, 2}
ϕ = ψ1Rψ2 Aϕ = (Q1 ∪· Q2 ∪· {q0}, q0, Σ, δ, F1 ∪· F2 ∪· {q0})
where δ(q0, α) = δ2(q0,2, α) ∧ (δ1(q0,1, α) ∨ q0)
and δ(q, α) = δi(q, α) when q ∈ Qi for i ∈ {1, 2}
For a quantified formula ϕ = ∃pi.ψ1, we construct the product automaton of
the Kripke structure K and the Bu¨chi automaton of ψ1. Here we reduce the
alphabet of the automaton by projecting all atomic proposition in APpi away:
ϕ = ∃pi.ψ1 Aϕ = (Q1 × S ∪· {q0}, Σ \ APpi, δ, F1 × S)
where δ(q0, α) = {(q′, s′) | q′ ∈ δ1(q0,1, α ∪ α′), s′ ∈ τ(s0), (L(s0))pi =APpi α′}
and δ((q, s), α) = {(q′, s′) | q′ ∈ δ1(q, α ∪ α′), s′ ∈ τ(s), (L(s))pi =APpi α′}
Given the Bu¨chi automaton for the hyperproperty ψι∧ψ it remains to construct
the product with the k + 1-self composition of K. The transitions of the au-
tomaton are defined over labels from Σ = 2AP
∗
where AP ∗ = APσ ∪
⋃
i APpii .
2 The construction follows the one presented in [26] with a slight modification on
the labeling of transitions. Labeling over atomic proposition instead of the states
of the Kripke structure suffices, as any nondeterminism in the Kripke structure is
inherently resolved, because we quantify over trace not paths
Aψι∧ψ. This is necessary to identify which transition was taken in each copy of
K, thus, mirroring a tuple of traces in K. For each of the variables pi1, . . . pik and
σ we use following rule:
ϕ = ∃pi.ψ1 Aϕ = (Q1 × S ∪· {q0}, Σ, δ, F1 × S)
where δ(q0, α) = {(q′, s′) | q′ ∈ δ1(q0,1, α), s′ ∈ τ(s0), (L(s0))pi =APpi}
and δ((q, s), α) = {(q′, s′) | q′ ∈ δ1(q, α), s′ ∈ τ(s), (L(s))pi =APpi}
Finally, we transform the resulting alternating automaton to an equivalent Bu¨chi
automaton following the construction of Miyano and Hayashi [39].
4.4 Counting models of ω-Automata
Computing the number of words accepted by a Bu¨chi automaton can be done
by examining its accepting lassos. Consider, for example, the Bu¨chi automata
over the alphabet 2{a} in Figure 1. The automaton on the left has one accepting
lasso (q0)
ω and thus has only one model, namely {a}ω. The automaton on the
right has infinitely many accepting lassos (q0{})i{a}(q1({} ∨ {a}))ω that accept
infinitely many different words all of the from {}∗{a}({} ∨ {a})ω. Computing
q0start q1
a
¬a
∗
q0start q1
¬a
a
∗
Fig. 1. Bu¨chi automata with one model (left) and infinitely many models (right).
the models of a Bu¨chi automaton is insufficient for model checking quantita-
tive hyperproperties as we are not interested in the total number of models.
We rather maximize, respectively minimize, over sequences of subsets of atomic
propositions the number of projected models of the Bu¨chi automaton. For in-
stance, consider the automaton given in Figure 2. The automaton has infinitely
q0start q1
¬a ∧ b
a
b
Fig. 2. A two-state Bu¨chi automaton, such that there exist exactly two {b}-projected models for
each {a}-projected sequence.
many models. However, the maximum number of sequences σb ∈ 2{b} that cor-
respond to accepting lassos in the automaton with a unique sequence σa ∈ 2{a}
is two: For example, let n be a natural number. For any model of the automaton
and for each sequence σa := {}n{a}({})ω the automaton accepts the following
two sequences: {b}n{}{b}ω and {b}ω. Formally, given a Bu¨chi automaton B over
AP and a set A, such that A ⊆ AP , an A-projected model (or projected model
over A) is defined as a sequence σA ∈ (2A)ω that results in the A-projection of
an accepting sequence σ ∈ (2AP )ω.
In the following, we define the maximum model counting problem over au-
tomata and give an algorithm for solving the problem. We show how to use the
algorithm for model checking quantitative hyperproperties.
Definition 1 (Maximum Model Counting over Automata (MMCA)).
Given a Bu¨chi automaton B over an alphabet 2AP for some set of atomic propo-
sitions AP and sets X,Y, Z ⊆ AP the maximum model counting problem is to
compute
max
σY ∈(2Y )ω
|{σX ∈ (2X)ω | ∃σZ ∈ (2Z)ω. σX ∪ σY ∪ σZ ∈ L(B)}|
where σ ∪ σ′ is the point-wise union of σ and σ′.
As a first step in our algorithm, we show how to check whether the maximum
model count is equal to infinity.
Definition 2 (Doubly Pumped Lasso). For a graph G, a doubly pumped
lasso in G is a subgraph that entails a cycles C1 and another different cycle C2
that is reachable from C1.
Fig. 3. Forms of doubly pumped lassos.
In general, we distinguish between two types of doubly pumped lassos as shown
in Figure 3. We call the lassos with periods C1 and C2 the lassos of the doubly
pumped lasso. A doubly pumped lasso of a Bu¨chi automaton B is one in the
graph structure of B. The doubly pumped lasso is called accepting when C2 has
an accepting state. A more generalized formalization of this idea is given in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let B = (Q, q0, δ, 2
AP, F ) be a Bu¨chi automaton for some set of
atomic propositions AP = X ∪ Y ∪ Z and let σ′ ∈ (2Y )ω. The automaton B
has infinitely many X ∪ Y -projected models σ with σ =Y σ′ if and only if B
has an accepting doubly pumped lasso with lassos ρ and ρ′ such that: 1) ρ is an
accepting lasso 2) tr(ρ) =Y tr(ρ
′) =Y σ′ 3) The period of ρ′ shares at least one
state with ρ and 4) tr(ρ) 6=X tr(ρ′).
To check whether there is a sequence σ′ ∈ (2Y )ω such that the number of X∪Y -
projected models σ of B with σ =Y σ
′ is infinite, we search for a doubly pumped
lasso satisfying the constraints given in Theorem 2. This can be done by applying
the following procedure:
Given a Bu¨chi automaton B = (Q, q0, 2
AP, δ, F ) and sets X,Y, Z ⊆ AP, we
construct the following product automaton B× = (Q×, q×,0, 2AP × 2AP, δ×, F×)
where: Q× = Q × Q, q×,0 = (q0, q0), δ× = {(s1, s2) (α,α
′)−−−−→ (s′1, s′2) | s1 α−→
s2, s
′
1
α′−→ s′2, α =Y α′} and F× = Q× F . The automaton B has infinitely many
models σ′ if there is an accepting lasso ρ = (q0, q0)(α1, α′1) . . . ((qj , q
′
j)(αj+1, α
′
j+1)
. . . (qk, q
′
k)(αk+1, α
′
k+1)) in B× such that: ∃h ≤ j. q′h = qj , i.e., B has lassos ρ1
and ρ2 that share a state in the period of ρ1 and ∃h > j. αh 6=X α′h, i.e.,
the lassos differ in the evaluation of X in a position after the shared state and
thus allows infinitely many different sequence over X for the a sequence over Y .
The lasso ρ simulates a doubly pumped lasso in B satisfying the constraints of
Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Given an alternating Bu¨chi automaton A = (Q, q0, δ, 2
AP, F ) for
a set of atomic propositions AP = X ∪ Y ∪ Z, the problem of checking whether
there is a sequence σ′ ∈ (2Y )ω such that A has infinitely many X ∪ Y -projected
models σ with σ =Y σ
′ is Pspace-complete.
The lower and upper bound for the problem can be given by a reduction from
and to the satisfiability problem of LTL [4]. Due to the finite structure of Bu¨chi
automata, if the number of models of the automaton exceed the exponential
bound 2|Q|, where Q is the set of states, then the automaton has infinitely many
models.
Lemma 1. For any Bu¨chi automaton B, the number of models of B is less or
equal to 2|Q| otherwise it is ∞.
Proof. Assume the number of models is larger than 2|Q| then there are more
than 2|Q| accepting lassos in B. By the pigeonhole principle, two of them share
the same 2|Q|-prefix. Thus, either they are equal or we found doubly pumped
lasso in B.
Corollary 1. Let a Bu¨chi automaton B over a set of atomic propositions AP
and sets X,Y ⊆ AP. For each sequence σY ∈ (2Y )ω the number of X ∪ Y -
projected models σ with σ =Y σY is less or equal than 2
|Q| otherwise it is ∞.
From Corollary 1, we know that if no sequence σY ∈ (2Y )ω matches to infinitely
many X ∪ Y -projected models then the number of such models is bound by
2|Q|. Each of these models has a run in B which ends in an accepting strongly
connected component. Also from Corollary 1, we know that every model has a
lasso run of length |Q|. For each finite sequence wY of length |wY | = |Q| that
reaches an accepting strongly connected component, we count the number X∪Y -
projected words w of length |Q| with w =Y wY and that end in an accepting
strongly connected component. This number is equal to the maximum model
counting number.
Algorithm 2 describes the procedure. An algorithm for the minimum model
counting problem is defined in similar way. The algorithm works in a backwards
Algorithm 2 Maximum Model Counting
Input: B = (Q, q0, 2
AP, δ, F ), disjoint X,Y, Z ⊆
AP, n ∈ N
Output: #X,Y,Z(B) > n
1: SCC = acceptingSCC(B)
2: i = 1
3: W =
⋃
S∈SCC
S
4: while i ≤ |Q| do
5: i = i+ 1
6: for q ∈ W do
7: for (q′, α, q) do
8: W ′ = W ′ ∪ {q′}
9: for σ ∈ Π(q) do
10: Π′(q′) = Π′(q′) ∪ {αY∪X · σ}
11: W = W ′
12: W ′ = ∅
13: for q ∈ W do
14: Π′(q) = ∅
15: return maxX,Y,Z Π(q0) ≥ n
q3
q1
q2
. . .
. . .
. . .
Π(q1) := {σ1, . . . , σk}
Π(q2) := {σ′1, . . . , σ′j}
Π(q3) := {α1σ1, . . . , α1σk}
∪ {α2σ′1, . . . , α2σj}
α1
α2
Fig. 4. Maximum Model Counting Algorithm (left) and a Sketch of a step in this algorithm (right):
Current elements of our working set are q1, q2 ∈ W and q3 ∈ W ′. If i = 0, i.e., we are in the first
step of the algorithm, then q1 and q2 are states of accepting SCCs.
fashion starting with states of accepting strongly connected components. In each
iteration i, the algorithm maps each state of the automaton with X∪Y -projected
words of length i that reach an accepting strongly connected component. After
|Q| iterations, the algorithm determines from the mapping of initial state q0 a
Y -projected word of length |Q| with the maximum number of matching X ∪ Y -
projected words.
Theorem 4. The decisional version of the maximum model counting problem
over automata (MMCA), i.e. the question whether the maximum is greater than
a given natural number n, is in NP#P .
Proof. Let a Bu¨chi automaton over an alphabet 2AP for a set of atomic proposi-
tions AP and sets APX ,APY ,APZ ⊆ AP and a natural number n be given. We
construct a nondeterministic Turing Machine M with access to a #P -oracle as
follows: M guesses a sequence σY ∈ 2APY . It then queries the oracle, to compute
a number c, such that c = |{σX ∈ (2APX )ω | ∃σZ ∈ (2APZ )ω. σX ∪ σY ∪ σZ ∈
L(B)}|, which is a #P problem [27]. It remains to check whether n > c. If so,
M accepts.
The following theorem summarizes the main findings of this section, which estab-
lish, depending on the property, an exponentially or even doubly exponentially
better algorithm (in the quantitative bound) over the existing model checking
algorithm for HyperLTL.
Theorem 5. Given a Kripke structure K and a quantitative hyperproperty ϕ
with bound n, the problem whether K |= ϕ can be decided in logarithmic space
in the quantitative bound n and in polynomial space in the size of K.
5 A Max#Sat-based Approach
For existential HyperLTL formulas ψι and ψ, we give a more practical model
checking approach by encoding the automaton-based construction presented in
Section 4 into a propositional formula.
Given a Kripke structure K = (S, s0, τ,APK , L) and a quantitative hyper-
property ϕ = ∀pi1, . . . , pik. ψι → (#σ : A. ψ)/n over a set of atomic propositions
APϕ ⊆ APK and bound µ, our algorithm constructs a propositional formula φ
such that, every satisfying assignment of φ uniquely encodes a tuple of lassos
(pi1, . . . , pik, σ) of length µ in K, where (pi1, . . . , pik) satisfies ψι and (pi1, . . . , pik, σ)
satisfies ψ. To compute the values max
(pi1,...,pik)
|{σA | (pi1, . . . , pik, σ) |= ψι ∧ ψ}|
(in case / ∈ {≤, <}) or min
(pi1,...,pik)
|{σA | (pi1, . . . , pik, σ) |= ψι ∧ ψ}| (in case
/ ∈ {≥, >}), we pass φ to a maximum model counter, respectively, to a minimum
model counter with the appropriate sets of counting and maximization, respec-
tively, minimization propositions. From Lemma 1 we know that it is enough to
consider lassos of length linear in the product automaton. The size of φ is thus
exponential in the size of ϕ and polynomial in the size of K.
The construction resembles the encoding of the bounded model checking
approach for LTL [16]. Let ψι = ∃pi′1 . . . pi′k′ . ψ′ι and ψ = ∃pi′′1 . . . pi′′k′′ . ψ′′ and
let APψι and APψ be the sets of atomic propositions that appear in ψι and
ψ respectively. The propositional formula φ is given as a conjunction of the
following propositional formulas:
φ =
∧
i≤k
JKKpiiµ ∧ JKKσµ ∧ JψιK0µ ∧ JψK0µ
where:
– µ is length of considered lassos and is equal to µ = 2|ψ
′
ι∧ψ′′|∗|S|k+k′+k′′+1+1,
which is one plus the size of the product automaton constructed from the
k + k′ + k′′ + 1 self-composition and the automaton for ψι ∧ ψ. The ”plus
one” is to additionally to check whether the number of models is infinite.
– JKKpik is the encoding of the transition relation of the copy of K where
atomic propositions are indexed with pi and up to an unrolling of length
k. Each state of K can be encoded as an evaluation of a vector of log |S|
unique propositional variables. The encoding3 is given by the propositional
formula I( #”v pi0 )∧
∧k−1
i=0 τ(
#”v pii ,
#”v pii+1) which encodes all paths of K of length k.
The formula I( #”v pi0 ) defines the assignment of the initial state. The formulas
τ( #”v pii ,
#”v pii+1) define valid transitions in K from the ith to the (i+ 1)st state
of a path.
– JψιK0k and JψK0k are constructed using the following rules4:
3 We refer the reader to [16] for more information on the encoding
4 We omitted the rules for boolean operators for the lack of space
i < k i = kJapiKik aipi ∨k−1j=0 (lj ∧ ajpi)J¬apiKik ¬aipi ∨k−1j=0 (lj ∧ ¬ajpi)J ϕ1Kik Jϕ1Ki+1k ∨k−1j=0 (lj ∧ Jϕ1Kjk)Jϕ1 U ϕ2Kik Jϕ2Kik ∨ (Jϕ1Kik ∧ Jϕ1 U ϕKi+1k ) ∨k−1j=0 (lj ∧ 〈ϕ1 U ϕ2〉jk)
〈ϕ1 U ϕ2〉ik Jϕ2Kik ∨ (Jϕ1Kik ∧ 〈ϕ1 U ϕ〉i+1k ) falseJϕ1Rϕ2Kik Jϕ2Kik ∧ (Jϕ1Kik ∨ Jϕ1RϕKi+1k ) ∨k−1j=0 (lj ∧ 〈ϕ1Rϕ2〉jk)
〈ϕ1Rϕ2〉ik Jϕ2Kik ∧ (Jϕ1Kik ∨ 〈ϕ1Rϕ〉i+1k ) true
in case of an existential quantifier over a trace variable pi, we add a copy of
the encoding of K with new variables distinguished by pi:J∃pi.ϕ1Kik JKKpik ∧ Jϕ1Kik
We define sets X = {aiσ | a ∈ A, i ≤ k}, Y = {ai | a ∈ APψ \ A, i ≤ k} and
Z = P \X ∪Y , where P is the set of all propositions in φ. The maximum model
counting problem is then MMC(φ,X, Y, Z).
5.1 Experiments
We have implemented the Max#Sat-based model checking approach from the
last section. We compare the Max#Sat-based approach to the expansion-based
approach usingHyperLTL [26]. Our implementation uses the MaxCount tool [29].
We use the option in MaxCount that enumerates, rather than approximates, the
number of assignments for the counting variables. We furthermore instrumented
the tool so that it terminates as soon as a sample is found that exceeds the given
bound. If no sample is found after one hour, we report a timeout.
Table 1 shows the results on a parameterized benchmark obtained from the
implementation of an 8bit passcode checker. The parameter of the benchmark is
the bound on the number of bits that is leaked to an adversary, who might, for
example, enter passcodes in a brute-force manner. In all instances, a violation is
found. The results show that the Max#Sat-based approach scales significantly
better than the expansion-based approach.
Benchmark Specification
MCHyper MCQHyper
#Latches #Gates #Quan. Time(sec) #max #count Time(sec).
Pwd 8bit 1bit leak
9 55
2 0.3 16 2 1
2bit leak 4 0.4 32 4 1
3bit leak 8 1.3 64 8 2
4bit leak 16 97 128 16 4
5bit leak 32 TO 256 32 8
6bit leak 64 TO 512 64 335
8bit leak 256 TO 2048 256 TO
Table 1. Comparison between the expansion-based approach (MCHyper) and the Max#Sat-based
approach (MCQHyper). #max is the number of maximization variables (set Y ). #count is the
number of the counting variables (set X). TO indicates a time-out after 1 hour.
6 Conclusion
We have studied quantitative hyperproperties of the form ∀pi1, . . . , pik. ϕ→ (#σ :
A. ψ / n), where ϕ and ψ are HyperLTL formulas, and #σ : A.ϕ / n compares
the number of traces that differ in the atomic propositions A and satisfy ψ to
a threshold n. Many quantitative information flow policies of practical inter-
est, such as quantitative non-interference and deniability, belong to this class of
properties. Our new counting-based model checking algorithm for quantitative
hyperproperties performs at least exponentially better in both time and space
in the bound n than a reduction to standard HyperLTL model checking. The
new counting operator makes the specifications exponentially more concise in
the bound, and our model checking algorithm solves the concise specifications
efficiently.
We also showed that the model checking problem for quantitative hyperprop-
erties can be solved with a practical Max#SAT-based algorithm. The SAT-based
approach outperforms the expansion-based approach significantly for this class
of properties. An additional advantage of the new approach is that it can handle
properties like deniability, which cannot be checked by MCHyper because of the
quantifier alternation.
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